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ACT Right to Life AssociationN E W S L E T T E R |
Third Quarter 1999
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Inside This Issue
Senate Inquiry
into Australia's Refugee and Humanitarian Program
President's Report
Right to Reply
Euthanasia in the
Netherlands
Developments in Foetal Photos
In June 1999 the ACT Right to Life Association made a submission to the Australian Senate's Inquiry into the Operation of Australia's Refugee and Humanitarian Program. Among other things, the Inquiry was established to investigate the claims that pregnant Chinese women were being deported by Australia and on their return to China these women were being forcibly aborted by the authorities. Extracts from the Association's submission follow...
The ACT Right to Life Association exists to protect human life from conception till natural death. The Association's interest in this Inquiry is principally in:
There is ample evidence that coercion exists in China's population control policy.
This coercion ranges from economic sanctions for women and their unauthorised children to
government officials taking women with an unauthorised pregnancy to a hospital for a
forced abortion. This coercion is part of state policy, as detailed in such
documents as the Hunan family planning rules and regulations and in the Sichuan province
family planning regulations.
The forced abortions being carried out in China are therefore a part of state-sponsored persecution of women who wish to have more than one child. This is a significant violation of human rights.
Women have their right to bear children guaranteed under international law:
Unborn children also have protection under international law:
Yet there are reports that unborn children are being aborted late in a pregnancy and
newborn children are being killed, in an indiscriminate effort to try to control
population numbers in China.
By trying to evade the one child policy, women are defying the government and challenging its authority. By disagreeing with the Chinese government's policy, and acting on that disagreement, they become political dissidents. Having a child in China is a political act. The failure of the Australian Government to recognise women who have unauthorised children as dissidents might be explained by the fact that bearing children is not regarded as a political act in Australia. Alternately, the failure or refusal to recognise the politicised nature of having a child in China might be more related to the Australian Government's reluctance to upset a major trading partner.
It is often implied, by those opposed to recognising the plight of Chinese women, that if we allow one refugee into Australia on the basis of persecution related to the one child policy, thousands of Chinese women will become pregnant in order to seek asylum in Australia. This argument does not take into account the fact that:
As I recently enthusiastically congratulated a friend on the news of her pregnancy I was surprised to see her start crying. She explained that she was moved by my enthusiasm for her pregnancy as her news had not been welcomed as warmly by other members of her family and friends. Whilst she and her husband had not planned the pregnancy they were thrilled to be having a baby. She shared that she found it hard to feel positive and excited about the baby as many people around her were not positive or excited by her news. She has even had a number of people ask why she didn't have an abortion and wait for a more convenient time to have a baby.
What has really been the impact of Australia's rising abortion rate and who is it affecting? I would argue there would be very few people in Australia who haven't been directly or indirectly affected by the change that abortion-on-demand has had on Australians' attitude to pregnancy.
It is an appalling reality that many women today are being asked to justify their pregnancies.
Nicola Pantos
President
Dealing with anti-life slogans
Slogan #5: You don't care if women die! Do you want a return to "coathanger/backyard" abortions?
The thrust of this slogan is that pro-lifers don't care
about women because they are forcing them to go to "backyard" abortionists and
thereby run the risk of dying when they should be able to have "safe", legal
abortions. (Of course, a "safe" abortion is a contradiction in terms -- we
know at least one person will die each time.)
Before his conversion, the former US abortionist Dr Bernard Nathanson was fond of quoting
figures of 5,000-10,000 deaths from illegal abortions in the USA each year in the period
preceding Roe v. Wade. He freely admits that the figures were made up but
nobody questioned them and, with enough repetition, they were accepted as fact.
We don't know how many women died as a result of "backyard" abortions and even
if it was only one woman, that would be one woman too many. However, abortions are never
the answer.
It is difficult to find out how many women die as a result of "safe" abortions
because in some cases the deaths occur after the woman leaves the abortion facility.
The deaths are then attributed to other causes. So rather than quote figures it may
be more useful to try another approach.
If pro-lifers don't care about women, why do they operate pregnancy counselling services
and crisis pregnancy centres? In Canberra, Karinya House was specifically set up to
help women who were facing a difficult pregnancy. Whereas the abortion providers
receive government funding, Karinya House was established entirely through volunteer
fundraising efforts. Surely that indicates that pro-lifers care about women.
Pregnancy counselling services obtain no money from the woman for the advice and
assistance they provide. They often receive no government funding either and are
staffed by volunteers who generously give up their time to help in this important
work. So if the pro-lifers receive no money, why do they do it? Obviously
because they care. Can the abortion facilities claim the same? If they
received no money from the government or from the women would they continue to provide
abortions? Obviously not, so their real motivation may be financial rather that
altruistic.
The final contradiction to the pro-abortion advocate's position is that around half of the
babies aborted each year are women.
Dr John Keown, lecturer in the law and ethics of
medicine at the University of Cambridge, spoke at the National Convention Centre,
Canberra, on 13 July 1999. The event was co-hosted by Right to Life Australia
and the ACT Right to Life Association. What follows is an edited version of
his address.
There is only one country in which euthanasia is officially condoned and widely
practiced: the Netherlands. Although euthanasia is proscribed by the Dutch
Penal Code, the Dutch Supreme Court held in 1984 that a doctor who kills a patient may, in
certain circumstances, successfully invoke the defence of necessity, also contained in the
Code, to justify the killing. In the same year, the Royal Dutch Medical Association
(KNMG) issued its members with guidelines for euthanasia. Since that time the lives
of thousands of Dutch patients have been intentionally shortened by their doctors.
A requirement central to both the legal and medical guidelines has been the free and
explicit request of the patient. Defenders of the guidelines have claimed that they
permit voluntary euthanasia but not euthanasia without request; that they are sufficiently
strict and precise to prevent any slide down a 'slippery slope' to euthanasia without
request, and that there has been no evidence of any such slide in the Netherlands.
The question addressed in this address can be simply put: does the Dutch experience
of euthanasia lend any support to the claims of supporters of voluntary euthanasia or does
it, rather, tend to support the claims of opponents of voluntary euthanasia that it leads
down a 'slippery slope' to euthanasia without request?
The 'slippery slope' argument is often thought of as one argument but it is more
accurately understood as comprising two independent yet related forms: the 'logical'
and the 'empirical'. In its logical form, the argument runs that acceptance of
voluntary euthanasia leads to acceptance of at least non-voluntary euthanasia (that is,
the killing of patients incapable of requesting euthanasia such as newborns or those with
advanced senile dementia) because the former rests on the judgement that some lives are
not 'worth' living, which judgement can logically be made even if the patient is incapable
of requesting euthanasia. Doctors are not automata who simply execute their
patient's wishes, however autonomous. They are professionals who form their own
judgement about the merits of any request for medical intervention.
A responsible doctor would no more euthanase a patient just because the patient
autonomously asked for it any more than the doctor would prescribe anti-depressant drugs
for a patient just because the patient autonomously requested them. The doctor, if
acting professionally, would decide in each case whether the intervention was truly in the
patient's best interests. A responsible doctor would no more kill a patient who had,
in the doctor's opinion, a life 'worth' living any more than he would prescribe
anti-depressants for a patient who, in the doctor's opinion, was not depressed.
Consequently, the alleged justification of voluntary euthanasia rests fundamentally not on
the patient's autonomous request but on the doctor's judgement that the request is
justified because the patient no longer has a life 'worth' living. And, if a doctor
can make this judgement in relation to an autonomous patient, he can, logically, make it
in relation to an incompetent patient. Moreover, if death is a 'benefit' for
competent patients suffering certain conditions, why would it be denied incompetent
patients suffering from the same conditions?
In its empirical form, the 'slippery slope' argument runs that even if a line can, in
principle, be drawn between voluntary and non-voluntary euthanasia, a slide will occur in
practice because the safeguards to prevent it cannot be made effective. A common
illustration of the argument in this form is the story of decriminalised abortion in
England, where the law allowing therapeutic abortion has conspicuously failed to prevent
widespread abortion for social reasons.
The empirical argument is, of course, dependent on empirical evidence. Invaluable
evidence about euthanasia in Holland has of late been provided by a large-scale survey
carried out on behalf of a Commission appointed by the Dutch Government to investigate
medical decision-making in Holland at the end of life.
First, an important word about terminology. A standard definition of 'euthanasia' is
'the intentional putting to death of a person with a incurable or painful disease'.
It is common to refer to euthanasia carried out by an act as 'active' euthanasia and
euthanasia by omission as 'passive' euthanasia. A common further sub-division is
between 'voluntary', 'non-voluntary' and 'involuntary' euthanasia, which refer
respectively to euthanasia at the patient's request, where the patient is incompetent, and
where the patient is competent but has made no request.
Dutch definitions of 'euthanasia' are, typically, markedly narrower, such as 'the
purposeful acting to terminate life by someone other than the person concerned upon
request of the latter'. It will be apparent that this is narrower than the usual
definition in two respects: it is limited to cases of active killing where there is
a request by the patient. In short, the Dutch definition corresponds to what is
normally called 'active, voluntary euthanasia'.
In a series of decisions straddling [the landmark 1984 case referred to earlier], lower
courts have laid down a number of conditions which have hitherto been understood as being
required for a doctor successfully to avail himself of the necessity defence, though there
is increasing uncertainty as to which, if any, are required. Subject to this
important caveat, they were listed in 1989
as follows:
(1) The request for euthanasia must come only from the patient and must be entirely free
and voluntary.
(2) The patient's request must be well-considered, durable and persistent.
(3) The patient must be experiencing intolerable (not necessarily physical) suffering,
with no prospect of improvement.
(4) Euthanasia must be a last resort. Other alternatives to alleviate the patient's
situation must have been considered and found wanting.
(5) Euthanasia must be performed by a physician.
(6) The physician must consult with an independent physician colleague who has experience
in this field.
A leading Dutch defender of euthanasia has claimed (a claim reproduced with uncritical,
almost robotic repetition in many newspaper articles on this subject) that the Guidelines
are 'strict' and 'precise'. However, even a cursory examination indicates that this
is not the case.
[A]s Professor Leenen, a leading Dutch health lawyer (and supporter of legalised
euthanasia) has observed, concepts such as 'unbearable pain' (a fortiori, one might
add, 'suffering') are open to subjective interpretation and are incapable of precise
definition.
A hypothetical case may help highlight their inherent vagueness. A leading Dutch
practitioner of euthanasia, who is highly respected in Holland, has said that he would be
put in a very difficult position if a patient told him that he wanted euthanasia because
he felt he was a nuisance to his relatives who wanted him dead so they could enjoy his
estate. Asked whether he would rule out euthanasia in such a case, the doctor
replied:
'I think in the end I wouldn't, because that kind of influence - these children wanting
the money now - is the same kind of power from the past that
shaped us all. The
same thing goes for religion
education
the kind of family he was raised in, all
kinds of influences from the past that we can't put aside.'
If such a leading practitioner of euthanasia, can interpret the Guidelines requiring an
'entirely free and voluntary request' and 'unbearable suffering' as possibly extending to
such a case, little more need to be said about their inherent vagueness and
elasticity. In short, because of their vagueness and the fact that they entrust the
decision-making to the individual practitioner, the Guidelines are simply incapable, of
ensuring that euthanasia is carried out in accordance with the criteria they specify.
Further details of Dr Keown's work can be found
in Euthanasia Examined: Ethical, Clinical and Legal Perspectives, edited by
John Keown. Cambridge University Press, 1997.
In late July negotiations were still ongoing within the
ACT Legislative Assembly to determine the final content of the informed consent booklet
for women considering an abortion.
At present it seems that regulations proposed by ACT Attorney General Gary Humphries MLA
and Urban Services Minister Brendan Smyth MLA will substantially improve the draft booklet
issued in June. It also appears that these improvements will include foetal
photographs. While there are indications that nine of the seventeen MLAs will
support the changes, this number will not be tested until there is a debate on the new
regulations when Assembly sittings resume on 24 August.
The booklet is intended to give women considering abortion full information, including the
medical risks of abortion and the development of their unborn child. The hope is
that better informed women will be less likely to seek an abortion.
The provision of an official information booklet is significant, as until now the abortion
facility or its owner --Family Planning ACT -- despite having an obvious conflict of
interest, has provided much (if not all) of the information that many women received when
considering abortion.
An Advisory Panel on Abortion Information was formed in April. This seven member
panel included three members nominated by the Calvary Hospital Board. However the
panel appears to have quickly accepted many of the arguments put forward by abortion
lobbyists. Documents obtained under Freedom of Information legislation by the
ACT Right to Life Association indicate that on the Panel's first meeting on 27 April, they
agreed:
· to use information from the Western Australian information pamphlet as there was no
time for research;
· to drop foetal photographs from the information to be given to women because they are "irrelevant
and in some cases could be counterproductive and cloud the issues";
· to only ask two groups for comment on the early drafting of the booklet -- the abortion
facility and the ACT Division of General Practice. Both these groups had opposed the
Osborne legislation.
The Western Australian information booklet, Medical Risk of Induced Abortion and of
Carrying a Pregnancy to Term, is unsatisfactory because it equates the significance of
undergoing an elective procedure to end an unborn life with a normal pregnancy ending in a
new baby being born.
The Department had emphasised the lack of time because they were already behind their
schedule which appears to have only allowed two or three weeks for the Advisory Panel to
consider, draft and approve the informed consent pamphlet.
The Health Minister, Michael Moore MLA, issued the new booklet to coincide with the date
the legislation came into effect on 11 June. Just over three of the twelve pages
were approved by the Advisory Panel. The balance of the booklet was comprised of
either information approved by the Health Minister or information provided by the ACT
Department of Health and Community Care.
A number of MLAs expressed surprise that foetal photographs were not included in the
information despite there being an expectation from the legislation that the photographs
would appear. In order to answer criticism from these pro-life MLAs, the Health
Minister wrote to all the MLAs to ask them their view of the intention of the Assembly.
President of the ACT Right to Life Association, Nicola Pantos, wrote on 14 June to
the MLAs who had supported the Osborne legislation, urging them to support the call for
foetal photographs to be included, as well as asking for a number of other amendments to
the booklet. Ms Panto's letter went into great detail describing the problems
of the booklet, including pointing out:
· the inclusion of pictures would do no more than provide accurate factual information;
· women should not be kept in the dark by excluding this information from the booklet;
- You may have heard a radio interview during last year's debate on this issue where a
former counsellor for Women Hurt by Abortion stated that many young women
were not aware of foetal development, and were devastated after their abortion when
they found out.
· the decision making process surrounding an abortion is a very upsetting time.
Excluding information such as foetal pictures will not diminish the stress involved, but
will prevent women from giving full informed consent;
· the booklet adopts the standard story of the abortion lobby that post abortion grief is
very rare and is the result of an abortion being sought under pressure from others, or
because the unborn child had a disability;
- The incidence of post abortion grief is difficult to gauge, as it has not been
adequately studied or recognised officially. The present booklet denies many women
who have sought an abortion the right to have their grief legitimised. Evidence from
many counselling agencies confirms this type of grief is widespread.
- The contents of the booklet also contrast with comments made by Professor David
Ellwood, who said "I think it's important that women who are choosing abortion are
aware of the fact there will be psychological consequences. They will go through
some degree of grieving following the procedure and it is often difficult for each
individual to assess just what the psychological consequences could be." (ABC
Radio 2CN, 19 November 1998).
· The booklet does not mention the possible increased risk of breast cancer
associated with abortion. The debate over the link between abortion and breast
cancer was covered in detail during community debate on the Osborne legislation last year.
· There is a general use of the language of choice which in parts does not make adequate
reference to the law. This text is misleading to women reading the booklet, as an
abortion is not a choice that can be made without reference to the law. Some
examples are:
- 'For women who decide to take up the responsibilities of parenthood' (page 2); and
- 'You can make a decision to continue your pregnancy or seek a termination under medical
supervision.' (page 3).
These statements should be rewritten and qualified by the requirements of the law.
The booklet also raises a number of questions for women to consider. One of these
questions, which asks how having a child might affect a woman's education or career,
blatantly reinforces discriminatory attitudes in our society by encouraging abortion,
rather than changing discriminatory structures in order to accommodate women's
reproductive lives. All women, whether they have children or not, should be able to
pursue their education or career.
The Association recently made a submission to the Human Rights and Equal Opportunity
Commission's Inquiry into Pregnancy and Work which explores these issues in more
detail. (Copies of the submission are available on our web site, or by phoning our
office.)
The booklet implies that it is legal to seek an abortion because the unborn child has a
disability (page 5). These are not legal grounds, even in the broadest
interpretation of the law, for an abortion. A civilised society is about sharing our
common humanity and acknowledging the value of all the people in our community.
The demonising of disability is aptly demonstrated by the often-used phrase 'severe foetal
abnormality'. What this phrase really means is that all unborn children who can be
detected with a disability, whether it be Spina Bifida, Down Syndrome or another
condition, will be in danger of abortion. Both Spina Bifida and Down Syndrome are
disabilities which present great challenges, but with which many people in our community
live happy lives. These people are not the monsters implied by the offensive term
'severe foetal abnormality'.